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I. INTRODUCTION 
The  U.S.  economy  has  experienced  nine  reces- 
sions  over  the  post-World  War  II  period.  Whether 
the  causes  of  these  recessions  are  primarily  real  or 
monetary  has been  widely  debated.  In this  paper  we 
examine  two  seemingly  conflicting  results  regarding 
the  primary  causes  of contractions  in U.S.  economic 
activity  since  the  end  of  World  War  II.  One  set  of 
results  obtained  by Hamilton  (1983)  shows  that  major 
downturns  in U.S.  economic  activity  are  associated 
with  prior  exogenous  increases  in  oil  prices,  while 
another  set  of  results  established  by  Romer  and 
Romer  (1989)  indicate  that  exogenous  tightening  in 
monetary  policy  is  the  major  cause  of  declines  in 
industrial  production  and increases  in unemployment. 
We  note  that  while  Hamilton  is careful  not  to  rule 
out  the  role policy  may  play  in determining  economic 
activity,  he  does  place  heavy  emphasis  on the  effects 
of  oil prices.  Romer  and  Romer  are  more  emphatic 
in their  belief  that  they  have  uncovered  exogenous 
monetary  policy  and  that  this  policy  is solely  respon- 
sible  for  the  events  they  study.  We  wish  to examine 
their  contention  by  testing  whether  real  distur- 
bances  could  simultaneously  be  influencing  Federal 
Reserve  policy  and  downturns  in economic  activity. 
Given  Hamilton’s  work  and  the  fact  that  four  of 
the  six  episodes  that  the  Romers  associate  with 
exogenous  monetary  policy  are very  close  to oil price 
shocks,  we  check  to  see  if these  shocks  are  respon- 
sible for their  results.  We  find that  including  oil prices 
in their  analysis  makes  monetary  policy  as specified 
by  the  Romers  insignificant. 
Negating  the  results  of  Romer  and  Romer  does 
not  imply  that  monetary  policy  plays  no role  in deter- 
mining  economic  activity.  Following  McCallum’s 
(1983)  suggestion,  which  is  also  implemented  by 
Sims  (1991),  we  use  interest  rates  as  a  proxy  for 
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monetary  policy  in  Hamilton’s  model.  Specifically, 
we use  the  federal  funds  rate  and the  spread  between 
the  ten-year  Treasury  bill rate  and  the  funds  rate  as 
depicting  the  relative  tightness  of  monetary  policy. 
In  this  setting  we  find  that  both  oil  price  increases 
and  movements  in interest  rates  are  significant  in our 
statistical  analysis  of  real  GNP  and  employment. 
Further,  an  analysis  of  impulse  response  functions 
and  variance  decompositions  indicates  that  innova- 
tions  in both  oil price  increases  and  interest  rates  are 
associated  with  subsequent  movements  in  real 
economic  activity. 
II.  LITERATURE  REVIEW 
Here  we  review  the  analysis  presented  in  the 
papers  of  Romer  and  Romer  (1989)  and  Hamilton 
(1983)  that  are  of  primary  interest  to  the  subject 
of  this  paper.  More  broadly,  these  two  papers 
repreient  contributions  to  the  ongoing  debate  in 
macroeconomics  concerning  the  primary  source  of 
economic  fluctuations.  Are  these  sources  primarily 
real  or  monetary? 
Romer  and  Romer  (1989)  adopt  the  perspective 
of the  seminal  work  of Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963) 
that  monetary  policy  explains  much  of the  variation 
in economic  activity.  In  performing  their  investiga- 
tion  of  the  relationship  between  monetary  policy 
and  movements  in U.S.  economic  activity  over  the 
post-World  War  II  period,  they  use  Friedman  and 
Schwartz’s  methodology,  which  they  term  the  “nar- 
rative  approach.”  This  approach  attempts  to  isolate 
historically  exogenous  monetary  policy  and  then 
analyze  the  effects  of  such  policy  on  economic 
activity.  Whether  or  not  they  have  accurately 
identified  exogenous  monetary  shocks  is  the  basis 
of  our  critical  evaluation  of  their  work. 
The  Romers’  (1989)  conclusion  is  that  six  of 
the  eight  postwar  recessions  in  their  data  set  were 
caused  by  contractionary  monetary  shocks.  The 
identification  of these  monetary  shocks  is based  on 
examinations  of  the  “Record  of  Policy  Actions”  of 
the  Board  of Governors  and the  Federal  Open  Market 
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FOMC  prior  to  their  discontinuance  in  1976.  The 
Romers  identify  as shocks,  “only  episodes  in which 
the  Federal  Reserve  attempted  to  exert  a contrac- 
tionary  influence  on the  economy  in order  to reduce 
inflation”  (p.  134).  Consequently,  the  Romers  never 
investigate  whether  expansionary  policy  also has real 
effects.  The  Romers  argue  that  the  Fed  only engages 
in  expansionary  policy  to  alleviate  an  economic 
downturn  once  it has  already  begun.  Thus,  it would 
be  difficult  to  isolate  the  effect  of  monetary  policy 
from  any  “natural  recovery  mechanism”  inherent  in 
the  economy.  After their  examination  of the  historical 
record,  the  Romers  identify  six  times  during  the 
postwar  period  that  the  Fed  caused  monetary  shocks. 
The  dates  of these  episodes  are  given  in Table  1. 
To  investigate  whether  these  monetary  shocks 
do  have  real  effects,  the  Romers  (1989)  conduct 
several  experiments.  Using  monthly  data  on  indus- 
trial  production  and  the  civilian  unemployment 
rate  from  January  1948  to  December  1987,  the 
Romers  estimate  a univariate  forecast  for 36 months 
following  each  of  the  monetary  shocks.  If  the 
actual  values  for  the  industrial  production  series 
were  lower  than  the  forecasted  values  based  on 
previous  values  of  each  series,  this  would  indicate 
that  monetary  policy  does  have  real  effects.  (The 
opposite  is  true  for  the  unemployment  rate,  since 
higher  rates  of  unemployment  are  associated  with 
economic  downturns.)  For  industrial  production, 
Table  1 
Dates of Monetary  and Oil Price Shocks 
Money  Oil  Prices 
October  1947  December  1947 
June  1953 
September  1955 
February  1957 
December  1968  March  1969 
December  1970 
April  1974  January  1974 
July  1974 
August  1978 
October  1979  June  1979 
January  1981 
August  1990 
they  find  the  average  maximum  deviation  of  the 
actual  value  from  the  forecasted  value  at a three-year 
horizon  was  -  14 percent,  with  a range  of  -8  per- 
cent  to  -2  1 percent.  With  the  exception  of  the 
December  1968  episode,  the  actual  unemployment 
rate  was typically  1.5 to 2.5  percentage  points  higher 
than  its forecasted  value  two  years  after  a monetary 
shock. 
As a second  experiment,  the  Romers  regress  both 
series  described  above  on  24  own  lags  and  36  lags 
of a dummy  variable  that  assumes  a value  of one  for 
the  six monetary  shocks  and  zero  otherwise.  From 
this  regression  an  impulse  response  function  is 
calculated  to  examine  the  effect  of a unit  shock  to 
the  dummy  variable.  For  industrial  production,  the 
impact  of the  monetary  shock  peaks  after 33 months, 
at  which  time  industrial  production  is  12  percent 
lower  than  it would  have  been  without  a monetary 
shock.  Similarly,  the  civilian  unemployment  rate 
peaks  after 34 months  and  is 2.1 percent  higher  than 
it  would  have  been  otherwise. 
Finally,  the  Romers  check  to  see  if other  factors 
could  be  responsible  for  their  results.  They  do  this 
in two ways.  First,  they  check  whether  supply  shocks 
affect  their  results  by  excluding  the  two  monetary 
shocks  that  could  be  associated  with  oil  price  in- 
creases  (April  1974  and  October  1979)  and  recal- 
culating  the  impulse  response  functions.  They  find, 
however,  that  the  new  impulse  response  functions 
are’ essentially  unchanged. 
As  a  further  test,  the  Romers  include  a  supply 
shock  measure,  namely,  the  relative  price  of crude 
petroleum,  in their  regressions.  Again,  their  results 
are  essentially  unchanged. 
It  is unclear,  however,  on  what  basis  they  reach 
their  conclusion  that  supply  shocks  have  little  im- 
pact  on  the  effect  of their  monetary  shock  variable. 
It  appears  to  us  that  their  claim  is based  solely  on 
the  shape  and  magnitude  of  the  impulse  response 
functions.  If  so,  their  conclusion  is  of  limited 
interest.  For  instance,  in  the  presence  of  other 
explanatory  variables,  the  same  impulse  response 
function  would  be  obtained  if the  estimated  coeffi- 
cients  for the  money  dummy  variable  remained  the 
same  but  the  standard  error  of  the  coefficient  in- 
creased.  Such  a  situation  would  imply  a  less  sta- 
tistically  significant  effect of the  monetary  shock.  For 
this  reason,  we  feel  that  testing  the  sum  of  coeffi- 
cients  in a regression  would  provide  a better  estimate 
of the  significance  of both  monetary  and  supply  (i.e., 
oil) shocks.  We  perform  this test  in the  next  section. 
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Romer  claim  that  supply  shocks-in  particular  .oil 
price  shocks-are  unimportant  in influencing  postwar 
U.S.  economic  activity  is  based  on  the  influential 
empirical  work  of  Hamilton  (1983,  1985)  and  the 
theoretical  work  of Finn  (199 1). Hamilton’s  empirical 
work  provides  the  basis  for  our  investigation  in 
Section  IV and will be discussed  in detail.  Finn’s work 
is also relevant  since  it provides  an interesting  model 
in  which  oil  price  shocks  act  as  impulses  in  a  real 
business  cycle  model.  Her  work  argues  that  a  sig- 
nificant  portion  of economic  variability  attributed  to 
technological  innovations  is  actually  accounted  for 
by  oil  price  shocks. 
From  an  empirical  perspective,  Hamilton  (1983) 
notes  that  seven  of the  eight post-World  War  II reces- 
sions in his sample  have  been  preceded  by “dramatic” 
increases  in  the  price  of  crude  oil.  He  then 
hypothesizes  three  different  explanations  for  this 
observation.  First,  the  correlation  between  oil price 
increases  and  recessions  is  simply  coincidence. 
Second,  there  is  some  other  variable  or  set  of 
variables  that  not  only  cause  the  oil price  increases, 
but  also  cause  the  recessions.  Finally,  the  oil price 
increases  are at least  partly  responsible  for the  reces- 
sions.  Although  Hamilton  does  not  explicitly  refute 
the  first  hypothesis  in  his  (1983)  paper,  in  a  later 
paper  (1985)  he rejects  this hypothesis  at the  0.0335 
significance  level. 
Hamilton  (1983)  provides  a detailed  analysis  of the 
second  hypothesis.  As a starting  point,  he considers 
the  impact  of oil-prices  in Sims’s  (1980)  six-variable 
VAR  model  of the  economy.  This  model  includes 
real  GNP,  unemployment,  U.S.  prices,  wages, 
money  (Ml),  and  import  prices.  Collectively,  these 
variables  do  not  Granger-cause  oil  prices.  Using 
bivariate  Granger-causality  tests,  Hamilton  also finds 
that  individually  none  of the  six variables  in Sims’s 
model  Granger-cause  oil prices  when  four  lags  are 
used.  However,  oil  prices  do  Granger-cause  real 
GNP.  Oil prices  also Granger-cause  unemployment. 
The  only  variable  in  Sims’s  system  which  does 
Granger-cause  oil prices  is the change  in import  prices 
when  eight  lags  are  included.  Hamilton  concludes, 
however,  .that  import  prices  do  not  explain  fluctu- 
ations  in  economic  activity  sufficiently  to  merit 
consideration  as a variable  that  is jointly  causing  oil 
prices  and  economic  fluctuations. 
To  further  insure  that  no  other  third  explanatory 
variable  is responsible  for  both  the  increases  in  oil 
prices  and the  declines  in real GNP,  Hamilton  (1983) 
tests  several  other  series  to see if they  Granger-cause 
oil  prices.  Various  output  measures,  including 
nominal  GNP,  the  ratio  of inventories  to  sales,  the 
index  of leading  economic  indicators,  the  index  of 
industrial  production,  and  the  ratio  of man-days  idle 
due to strikes  to total employment  are used.  Of these 
various  measures,  only the  ratio of man-days  idle due 
to  strikes  to  total  employment  Granger-causes  oil 
prices.  As with  import  prices,  variations  in this series 
still  do  not  account  for  the  cyclical  variation  of 
output.  Several  different  price  series  are  also 
checked.  Only  one  of the  seven  prices  series  con- 
sidered,  the  price  of coal,  Granger-causes  oil prices 
when  both  four  and  eight  lags  are  included.  Again, 
however,  this  series  cannot  explain  future  output. 
Finally,  two  financial  variables  are  considered-the 
yields  on  BAA bonds  and  the  Dow-Jones  Industrial 
Average.  Neither  of  these  variables  are  found  to 
Granger-cause  oil prices.  Thus,  Hamilton  concludes 
there  is  little  evidence  that  some  third  variable 
explains  both  the  increases  in  oil  prices  and  the 
recession  that  normally  follows.  Since  both  the  first 
and  second  hypotheses  have  been  rejected,  his 
finding  bolsters  the  argument  for the  last alternative. 
Specifically,  “the  timing,  magnitude,  and/or  duration 
of at least  some  of the  recessions  prior  to  1973 would 
have  been  different  had  the  oil  price  increase  or 
attendant  energy  shortages  not  occurred”  (1983, 
p.  247). 
III.  A REEXAMINATIONOFTHE  ROMER 
ANDROMERHYPOTHESIS 
Romer  and  Romer  (1989)  attempt  to uncover  the 
effects  of monetary  policy  by examining  the  response 
of the  economy  to  unexpected  exogenous  tighten- 
ing  in policy.  By focusing  on  monetary  tightness  in 
response  to excessive  inflation,  they  claim  an ability 
to isolate  shocks  that  are purely  monetary  in nature. 
For  this procedure  to capture  solely monetary  events 
it is important  that  the  inflationary  pressures  that  the 
Fed  is reacting  to are not  caused  by real disturbances. 
As  one  can  see  from  Table  1 and  Chart  1,  four  of 
their  dates  are very  near  positive  shocks  to oil prices 
(POIL).  Indeed,  in both  the  1974  and  1979 episodes 
the  effects  of  oil  price  increases  on  inflation  were 
discussed  at  FOMC  meetings. 
In  order  to  sort  out  the  effects  of  oil  prices  and 
the  six  contractionary  episodes  selected  by  Romer 
and  Romer,  we  include  the  percent  change  in  oil 
prices  (OIL)  in  a  reexamination  of  their  statistical 
results.  We  first  replicate  their  results  in  Table  2, 
and then  check  them  for sensitivity  to slight  changes 
in lag structure  and  the  sample  period.  We  perform 
this  check  because  our  oil  price  data  does  not 
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POSITIVE  OIL  PRICE  SHOCKS 
1947  51  55  59 
Note:  Shading  denotes  recessions. 
Table  2 
The Romer and Romer Results* 
IPt  =  0~0 +  E  BliMit  +  ‘c” BzjlPt-j  +  E  BskMDt-k, 
i=l  j=l  k=O 
where  IP  =  the  log  change  of  industrial  production, 
M  =  a  set  of  monthly  seasonal  dummy  variables, 
and  MD  =  the  Rome&  dummy  variable  for  contractionary  monetary  shocks. 
Sample  Period 
IP 
MD  (n=36) 
f$D  (n =  24) 
R 
S.E.E. 
1948:2-  1948:2-  1950:1-  1950:1- 
1987:12  1987:  12  1990:  12  1990:12 
-  .219(.327)  -  .134(.506)  -  .162(.460)  -  .059(.77) 
-  .100(.0167)  -  .089(.028) 
-  .085(.0066)  -  .071(.023) 
.790  .788  .796  .794 
.0132  .0132  .0127  .0128 
U  =  ‘~0  +  alTREND  +  ‘2  BliMit  =  f!  B2jU-j  +  E  B3kMDt-kv 
i=l  j=l  k=O 
where  U  =  the  civilian  unemployment  rate,  and  the  remaining  variables  are 
as  described  above. 
1948:  l-  1948:1-  1950:  l-  1950:1- 
Sample  Period  1987:12  1987:12  1990:  12  1990:  12 
U  .972(.000)  .971(.000)  .973(.000)  .973(.000) 
MD  (n=36)  2.106f.016)  2.06  LO141 
yp  (n =  24)  1.25  f.054)  1.06  t.097) 
R  .977  ,  .977  .977  .977 
S.E.E.  .267  .268  .259  ,261 
*  The  reported  results  are  the  estimated  sum  of  coefficients  for  each  variable,  with  the  p-value  for  the  t-test  testing  the  null 
hypothesis  that  this  sum  equals  zero  included  in  parenthesis.  The  estimates  for  the  constant  and  monthly  dummies,  as  well 
as  the  trend  term  in  the  employment  regression,  are  not  reported. 
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to make  sure  that  we do not  confuse  oil price  effects 
with  a slight  change  of specification.  As one  can  see 
from  the  results  in the  table,  the  sum  of coefficients 
on  the  money  dummy  is significant  at  the  10 per- 
cent  level  in all regressions  and at the  5 percent  level 
in  most  regressions.  Therefore,  our  results  con- 
cerning  the  addition  of  oil  prices  reflect  the  effect 
of  oil  prices.  (See  Tables  3a  and  3b.) 
The  real  price  of  oil  series  is  derived  using 
Mark’s  (1989)  procedure  that  corrects  -for the  effect 
of price  controls  in the  early  1970s.  As mentioned, 
the  regressions  are  run  on  monthly  data  over  a 
slightly  different  sample  period  than  the  one  used 
by Romer  and Romer  (1989).  We  analyze  the period 
1950:1-199O:lZ.  As  in  their  analysis,  we  include 
seasonal  dummies  and  a trend  in the  regressions  for 
unemployment.  Our  specification  includes  .only  24 
lags of the  dependent  variable  rather  than  the  36 lags 
employed  in their  study.’  The  dependent  variables 
examined  are  the  percent  change  in  industrial  pro- 
duction  (IP)  and  the  unemployment  rate  (U).  The 
independent  variables  are  the  Romer  and  Romer 
money  dummy  (MD)  and  oil  (OIL).  We  also 
examine  regressions  in  which  we  separate  the 
effects  of  positive  oil  price  shocks  (POIL)  from 
negative  oil price  shocks  (NOIL). 
Tables  3a  and  3b  present  results  that  are  con- 
sistent  with  the  methodology  of Romer  and  Romer. 
Implicit  in this  specification  is the  assumption  that 
the  money  dummy  and oil prices  are exogenous.  We 
also ran regressions  omitting  contemporaneous  values 
of oil prices  and the  money  dummy  with  little change 
in  results. 
In the  regressions  on industrial  production,  changes 
in  oil prices  have  asymmetric  effects.  This  finding 
is consistent  with  the  result  of Mork  (1989)  and  the 
discussion  in Shapiro  and  Watson  (1988).  There  are. 
numerous  reasons  why  the  effect  of  oil  prices  on 
economic  activity  may  be  asymmetric.  One  model 
that  formally  treats  this  asymmetry  is  Hamilton 
(1988),  which  relies  on specialized  labor  inputs  and 
on  movements  of  labor  across  sectors. 
In Hamilton’s  (1988)  model  any exogenous  change 
in  the  supply  of oil and  hence  its  price  can  induce 
unemployment.  Individuals  choose  to relocate  from 
an  industry  that  is  adversely  affected  by  oil  price 
’ Using  36 lags did  not  appreciably  alter  our results  and  the  slight 
change  in sample  period  needed  to accomodate  our oil price  data 
is  innocuous. 
shocks  if the  effect  of the  shock  is prolonged  enough 
to warrant  the-costs  associated  with  relocation.  Since 
-there  exist  some  industries  that  can  suffer  when  oil 
prices  rise as well as industries  that  suffer when  prices 
fall,  any  change  in oil prices  can  potentially  induce 
declines  in output  and  employment.  For  example, 
a  fall  in  the  price  of  oil  could  cause  a  contraction 
in  the  oil industry.  Analogously,  a rise  in  the  price 
could  cause  unemployment  and  a decline  in output 
in industries  that  use  oil as an  input  or that  produce 
goods  such  as  automobiles  that  rely  on  the  use  of 
oil.  Depending  on  the  relative  strength  of  income 
and  substitution  effects  and ‘the relative  importance 
of various  sectors  in the  economy,  the  effects  of oil 
price  changes  could  be  either  symmetric  or  asym- 
metric.  It  is  also  possible  that  a  rise  in  the  price 
of  oil  could  lead  to  a  decline  in  economic  activity 
while  a fall in the  price  of oil could  have  little  or no 
effect. 
Another  class  of models  that‘can  produce  asym- 
metric  results  are  models  that  involve  differential 
financing  costs  when  firms  finance  their  activities 
using  either  retained  earnings  or  external  finance 
[see  Gertler  (1988),  Fazzari,  Hubbard  and  Peterson 
(1988),  and  Gilchrist  (1989)].  In  the  absence  of 
complete  hedging  arrangements,  firms  relying  on oil 
as  an  essential  input  are  more  likely  to  bump  up 
against  a financing  constraint  when  oil prices  rise and 
thus  could  face  an increase  in their  effective  cost  of 
capital.  The  rise in the  effective  cost  of capital  would 
lower  investment  and  output. 
The  regression  results  in Tables  3a and 3b indicate 
that  positive  changes  in oil prices  are associated  with 
declines  in  industrial  production  while  monetary 
policy  is insignificant,  where  significance  is measured 
using  t-statistics  for the  sum  of the  coefficients.  The 
significance  levels  are depicted  inside  the  parentheses 
next  to  the  sums  of  coefficients.  With  regard  to 
unemployment,  changes  in’oil prices  have  a signifi- 
cant  positive  effect  while  monetary  policy  is  again 
insignificant.  Also,  if we  use  only  money  dummies 
for  the  two  periods-September  1955  and  August 
1978-that  are  not  contaminated  by  large  oil price 
movements,  the  sum  of  the  coefficients  on  the 
dummy  variable  is  insignificant. 
We  conclude  from  this- exercise  that  monetary 
policy  as  isolated  by  .Romer  and  Romer  is  not 
statistically  associated  with  subsequent  real economic 
activity.  Rather  it is the  presence  of oil price  shocks 
that  occurred  at  nearly  the  same  time  as their  con- 
tractionary  monetary  episodes  that  is responsible  for 
their  results. 
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Monthly Regression  Results* 
/Pt  =  ‘.YI +  E  BliMi,  +  ‘c”  Bzj/Pt-i  +  ‘c”  BskMDt-k  +  ‘c” B41POILt-1  +  ‘c”  65,NOILt-,, 
i=l  j=l  k=O  I=0  m=O 
where  IP  =  log  change  of  industrial  production 
M  =  a  set  of  monthy  seasonal  dummy  variables 
MD  =  the  Romers’  dummy  variable  for  contractionary  monetary  policy 
POIL  =  positive  log  changes  of  the  price  of  oil  constructed  according  to  Mork’s  (1989)  methodology 
NOIL  =  negative  log  changes  of  the  price  of  oil  constructed  according  to  Mork’s  (1989)  methodology. 












-  .234(.300)  -  .206(.351) 
-  .149(.089)  -  .144(.047)’ 
-  .009(.923) 
-  .044(.232)  -  .048(.  147) 
.792  .796 
.0128  .0127 
*  The  reported  results  are  the  estimated  sum  of  coefficients  for  each  variable,  with  the  p-value  for  the  t-test  testing  the  null 
hypothesis  that  this  sum  equals  zero  included  in parentheses.  The  estimates  for the  constant  and  monthly  dummies  are  not  reported. 
’  The  F-test  testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  POIL  equals  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  NOIL  was 
F(1,381)  =  2.723  with  a  p-value  of  ,100. 
Table  3b 
Monthly Regression  Results* 
Ut  =  “0  +  alTREND  +  E  BliMit  +  ‘c” BzjUt-j  +  ‘c”  BskMDt-k  +  ‘c”  B4lOILt-l, 
i=l  j=l  k=O  I=0 
where  U  =  the  civilian  unemployment  rate 
M  =  a  set  of  monthly  seasonal  dummies 
MD  =  the  Romers’  dummy  variable  for  contractionary  monetary  shocks 
and  OIL  =  log changes  in the  price  of oil  constructed  according  to  Mork’s  (1989)  methodology. 
1950:1- 
Sample  Period  1990:12 
U  .974(.000) 
OIL  3.65  (.0248)’ 
MD  .225(.760) 
-2 
R  .977 
S.E.E.  .261 
*  The  reported  results  are  the  estimated  sum  of  coefficients  for  each  variable,  with  the  p-value  for  the  t-test  testing  the  null 
hypothesis  that  this  sum  equals  zero  included  in parentheses.  The  estimates  for the  constant  and  monthly  dummies  are  not  reported. 
’  The  F-test  testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  POIL  equals  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  NOIL  was 
Ft1.380)  =  .0169  with  a  p-value  of  ,897. 
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In  this  section  we  reinvestigate  the  potential 
effects of monetary  policy in the  statistical model  used 
by  Hamilton  (1983).  In  his  study  monetary  policy 
is represented  by M 1. McCallum  (1983)  makes  the 
forceful  argument  that  policy  is better  represented 
by  short-term  interest  rates  since  over  most  of the 
postwar  period  the  operating  instrument  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  has been  the federal funds  rate.  Sims 
(1991)  also  supports  this  viewpoint.  We  use  two 
different  interest  rate measures  to represent  monetary 
policy.  They  are  the  average  federal  funds  rate  and 
the  spread  between  the  ten-year  Treasury  bill  rate 
and  the  funds  rate.  These  series  are  displayed  in 
Chart  2 and  Chart  3.  One  can  see  most  recessions 
are  preceded  by  a run-up  in the  funds  rate  or a flat- 
tening  or  inversion  of  the  yield  curve. 
The  empirical  results  are  displayed  in Table  4 for 
the  sample  period  195.5:3-1991:3,  where  we include 
four lags of each  variable.  Again we test  for an asym- 
metric  effect  of  oil  prices  on  output,  which  is 
measured  by  real  GNP.  The  other  variables  in the 
regression  are the  funds  rate  (RFF),  the  spread  (RS), 
the  unemployment  rate  (U),  import  prices  (IM),  the 
wage  rate  (W),  and  the  inflation  rate  (a)  as measured 
by  the  GNP  deflator.  Following  Hamilton  we  use 
first  differences  of the  logs  of GNP,  import  prices, 
the  wage  rate,  inflation,  and  oil  prices. 
The  results  indicate  that  both  positive  percent 
changes  in oil prices  and  our  interest  rate  measures 
have  significant  explanatory  power  in  explaining 
percentage  changes  in GNP.  The  signs  on the  coef- 
ficients  for both  our  interest  rate  measures  are  con- 
sistent  with  a monetary  policy  interpretation.  A rise 
in the  funds  rate  or  a rise  in the  funds  rate  relative 
to  long-term  interest  rates  (a  fall  in  the  spread)  is 
associated  with  restrictive  monetary  policy  and, 
hence,  with  declines  in  output. 
To  further  examine  our  results  we look  at variance 
decompositions  and  impulse  response  functions.  Our 
preferred  specification  is  to  order  positive  changes 
in oil prices  first  and  our  interest  rate  measures  last. 
We  prefer  this  because  (1)  oil price  rises  appear  to 
be  exogenous  events  [see  Hamilton  (1983,  1985)] 
and  (2) putting  interest  rates  last  in the  orthogonal- 
ization  implies  that  the  effects  of  interest  rates  are 
due  to  innovations  that  are  orthogonal  to  other 
variables  in the  system.  Thus  the  interest  rate  inno- 
vation  is orthogonal  to any taste  or technology  shocks 
that  affect  economic  activity  or  inflation.  These 
effects  may  reasonably  be  thought  of  as  policy. 
McCallum  (1983)  shows  that  when  the  monetary 
authority  uses  an  interest  rate  instrument,  innova- 
tions  in monetary  policy  are  best  captured  by  inno- 
vations  in  the  nominal  interest  rate.  By  ordering 
interest  rates  last  in our  orthogonalization,  we  hope 
to exclude  the  effects  of other  endogenous  variables 
Chart  2 
FEDERAL  FUNDS  RATE 
18  ::.:::  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .::.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..I.  :. 
*r  .:.:.:  .  .  .  . 
6 
. .  ;:j  ,:.:,:.  .:  ..:.:.:.:  .  .  .  .  .  .  .:.:  :.,..:.:  j::::., 
~‘1”‘1”‘1”‘1”‘1’“1”‘1”‘1”11”‘11~~l~~~l~~~l~~ 
58  62  66  70  74  78  82  86  90 
Note:  Shading  denotes  recessions. 
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Quarterly  Regression  Results for the Log Change  of Real GNP* 
GNPt =  cxo  +  i~l~~Jt-ip 
where  X  is  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables. 
(Note:  Each  column  below  corresponds  to  a  distinct  X-vector.) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
GNP  .0841(.784)  .045  (.88)  -.067  l.833)  -.068  t.83) 
POIL  -  .0723(.0136)’  -.077  (.0068)  -.079  (.007Y  -.083  LOO411 
NOIL  .0213(.398)  .029  t.255) 
RFF  -.OOl  LOO71  -.0012(.0019) 
RS  .003  (.004)  .0026(.005) 
U  .002  (.OOl)  .0021(.0015)  .0005(.457)  .0003(.66) 
IM  .096  t.197)  .ll  t.141  .173  l.026)  .188  t.0131 
W  -.718  LO771  -.69  CO781  -.528  t.175)  -.40  t.28) 
7r  .523  t.271)  .56  C.23)  .176  t.682)  -.088  t.83) 
-2 
R  .32  .31  .31  .30 
S.E.E.  .0082  .0082  .0082  .0083 
*  The  reported  results  are  the  estimated  sum  of  coefficients  for  each  variable  in  the  X-vector,  with  the  p-value  for  the  t-test 
testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  this  sum  equals  zero  included  in  parentheses.  Estimates  for  the  constant  term  are  not  reported. 
The  sample  period  is  1955:3-1991:3. 
’  The  F-test  testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  POIL  equals  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  NOIL  was 
F(1,112)  =  6.866  with  a  p-value  of  .Ol. 
2 The  F-test  testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  POIL  equals  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  NOIL  was 
F(1,112)  =  8.97  with  a  p-value  of  ,003. 
Chart  3 
INTEREST  RATE  SPREAD 
1954  58  62  66  70  74  78 
Note:  Shading  denotes  recessions. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  21 that  may  influence  Fed  behavior.  As a specification 
check  we  include  results  from  an  alternative  order- 
ing  in  which  interest  rates  are  ordered  first  and 
positive  oil price  changes  are  ordered  last. 
The  variance  decomposition  results  are  given  in 
Table  5.  In  our  preferred  specification  oil  prices 
explain  between  roughly  5 and  6 percent  of the  vari- 
ation  in GNP.  These  results  are  not  very  sensitive 
to  the  ordering  of  the  variables,  nor  do  they  seem 
to vary with respect  to the  interest  rate measure.  This 
evidence  is consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  oil 
prices  are exogenous.  The  federal  funds  rate explains 
about  5  percent  of  the  variation  in  output  in  our 
preferred  specification,  while  the  spread  explains 
roughly  8 percent  of the  variation  in GNP.  Not  sur- 
prisingly,  the  contribution  of these  two  variables  for 
changes  in  GNP  is  influenced  by  their  ordering  in 
the  orthogonalization. 
Charts  4a  and  4b  depict  the  summed  impulse 
response  functions  for  our  preferred  specification. 
The  cumulative  response  of GNP  to  a 1 percent  in- 
crease  in oil prices  peaks  in seven  quarters  at a value 
Table  5 
Variance  Decompositions  for Percent Change  in GNP 
(POIL  first,  RFF  last) 
1  .Ol  (  .oo,  2.29)  .oo  (  .oo,  .OO) 
4  2.03  (  .OO,  8.53)  5.29  (  .13,  11.49) 
8  5.09  (  .61,  13.50)  5.15  (  1.36,  10.51) 
12  5.71  (  .71,  14.62)  5.00  (  1.46,  10.36) 
16  5.83  (  .61,  15.21)  4.94  (  1.46,  10.36) 
1  .oo 
4  1.51 
8  4.92 
12  5.77 
16  6.35 
1  .Ol 
4  1.88 
8  5.29 
12  5.65 
16  5.58 
1  .oo  (  .oo,  .OO)  .Ol  (  .OO,  2.80) 
4  1.98  (  .oo,  7.50)  8.71  (  1.09,  18.61) 
8  5.89  (  .78,  13.29)  10.94  (  3.16,  21.24) 
12  6.85  (1.25,  14.58)  10.85  (  3.?7,  21.52) 
16  7.18  (1.20,  15.28)  11.25  (  3.22,  22.50) 
Percent 
of  Variance 
(PO1 L)  (RFD 
95%  Confidence 
interval 
Percent 
of  Variance 
Explained 
(POIL  last,  RFF  first) 
(PO1 L) 
(  .oo,  .OO) 
(  .OO,  6.94) 
(  .52,  12.69) 
(  .69,  14.12) 
(  .55,  15.36)  , 
(RFR 
3.58  (  .OO,  10.36) 
11.84  (  3.79,  21.18) 
14.17  (  5.97,  22.58) 
13.79  (  5.88,  22.21) 
13.65  (  5.84,  22.09) 
(POIL  first,  RS  last) 
(PO1 L) 
(  .OO,  2.51) 
(  .OO,  8.79) 
(  .26,  14.87) 
(  .50,  15.44) 
(  .49,  15.48) 
(RS) 
.oo  (  .oo,  .OO) 
7.43  (  .69,  15.15) 
7.93  (  1.80,  15.59) 
7.95  (  2.00,  15.99) 
8.38  (  1.83,  17.07) 
(POIL  last,  RS  first) 
(PO1 L)  (RS) 
95%  Confidence 
Interval 
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of  -.094  percent.  This  result  is very  close  to  the 
one  reported  in  Shapiro  and  Watson  (1988)  in  a 
somewhat  different  empirical  setting.  Our  result 
corresponds  to  a 4.23  percent  loss  in output  due  to 
a 45 percent  increase  in oil prices  attributable  to the 
1973  oil embargo.  The  response  of GNP  to a 1 per- 
cent  increase  in the  average  funds  rate for the period, 
which  equals  an increase  of 6.39  basis  points,  peaks 
at  13  quarters  with  a  decline  in  GNP  of  -.036 
percent.  This  change  would  correspond  to  a loss  in 
output  of 3.39  percent  in  response  to  a funds  rate 
increase  from  9.83  to  15.85.  These  last  numbers 
depict  the  run-up  in interest  rates  during  the  autumn 
of 1980 resulting  from the restrictive  monetary  policy 
conducted  by  the  Fed.  The  alternative  ordering  of 
Chart  Sa  Chart  Sb 
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the  variables  results  in  similar  impulse  response 
functions  for  a  positive  oil  price  shock,  while  the 
effect  of the  funds  is increased  by  about  50 percent. 
The  results  using the  spread  are depicted  in Charts 
5a and 5b. In our preferred  specification,  the response 
of GNP  to  a  1 percent  increase  in  oil prices  again 
peaks  in  the  seventh  quarter  at  a  value  of  -  .091 
percent  while  GNP’s  response  to  the  spread  peaks 
in quarter  nine  at a value  of  -  .0057  percent.  This 
result  implies  a 4.1  percent  loss in output  due  to the 
1973  oil embargo  and  a 4.25  percent  loss  in output 
due  to  the  1980  tightening  in  monetary  policy. 
Changing  the  ordering  of the  variables  increases  the 
effects  of  both  variables  by  about  20  percent. 
Actual 
-  -  -  -  95  Percent  Confidence  Bands 
__----_~---__--------.------~----- 
_---  ----  ---_ 
__----__---______~----~~--------- 
16  I  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  1011  1213141516 
Order:  POIL,  first;  RS,  last 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  23 To  further  examine  the  effects  of  oil  prices  and 
monetary  policy  on  real  economic  activity,  we  also 
look  at  the  response  of  the  percentage  change  of 
employment  in nonfarm  and  nongovernment  activi- 
ties  to changes  in oil prices  and  interest  rates.  These 
regressions  are given  in Table  6 and  are  identical  to 
those  reported  in Table  4, with  employment  replac- 
ing GNP.  The  results  using  the  spread  as a measure 
of monetary  policy  are consistent  with  our results  for 
GNP,  but  the  funds  rate  does  not  appear  to  affect 
employment  significantly.  Increases  in  oil  prices 
reduce  employment  and  enter  asymmetrically  in the 
empirical  specification  that  uses  the  spread,  a result 
consistent  with  Mork’s  (1989)  conclusions.  By con- 
trast,  we  reject  an  asymmetric  effect  in regressions 
with  the  funds  rate.  Taking  the  results  on GNP  and 
employment  together,  our  results  are  broadly  con- 
sistent  with  Mark’s  (1989)  finding  of  asymmetry. 
Regarding  variance  decompositions  (Table  7), 
positive  oil  price  shocks  account  for  roughly  8-10 
percent  of  the  variation  in  employment  when  oil 
prices  enter  first  in  the  orthogonalization.  Their 
contribution  is reduced  to about  6 percent  when  oil 
enters  last.  The  contribution  of the  monetary  policy 
variables  is greatly  enhanced  when  they  are  the  first 
element  in the orthogonalization.  This  result  indicates 
that  disturbances  other  than  those  depicting  policy 
are  included  in the  interest  rate  innovations.  In  our 
preferred  specification  the  funds  rate  contributes 
roughly  6  percent  to  the  variation  in  employment 
while  the  spread  contributes  about  15  percent. 
The  impulse  response  functions  also  look  very 
similar  to  those  depicted  for  GNP.  These  are 
displayed  in Charts  6a,  6b,  7a,  and  7b.  In  our  pre- 
ferred  specification,  the  effect  of a 1 percent  positive 
Table  6 
Quarterly  Regression  Results for the Log,Change  of Employment* 
where  X  is  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables. 













(1)  (2) 
.31  (.115)  .34  (.070) 
-  .031  (.084)'  -  .028  (. 108) 
-  ,010  C.52) 
-  .0003(.  19)  -  .0003(.  15) 
.50  t.0151  .47  t.0171 
.014  t.78)  .0016(.97) 
(3) 
.30  t.1221 
-  .039  (.03OY 
-  .0038(.81) 
.0013(.011) 
.35.  t.096) 
,059  t.23) 
-  .41  t.106)  -  .47  t.052)  -  .40  t.0951 
.63  t.039)  .68  t.0201  .53  t.0441 
.54  .56  .55 
.0051  .0051  .0051 
(4) 
.31  (.093) 
-  .036  t.036) 
.0013(.0062) 
.34  (.097) 
.051  t.27) 
-  .43  t.052) 
.56  t.024) 
.56 
.0050 
l  The  reported  results  are  the  estimated  sum  of  coefficients  for  each  variable  in  the  X-vector,  with  the  p-value  for  the  t-test 
testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  this  sum  equals  zero  included  in  parentheses.  Estimates  for  the  constant  term  are  not  reported. 
The  sample  period  is  1955:3-1991:3. 
1 The  F-test  testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  POIL  equals  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  NOIL  was 
F(1,ll.Z)  =  .95  with  a  p-value  of  ,332. 
z The  F-test  testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  POIL  equals  the  sum  of  coefficients  for  NOIL  was 
F(l,llZ)  =  2.56  with  a  p-value  of  .113. 
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Variance  Decompositions  for Employment 
Step 
Percent 
of  Variance 
Explained 
95%  Confidence 
lntefval 
1  .03  (  .OO,  2.66) 
4  1.61  (  .OO,  8.89) 
8  10.25  (  .26,  22.16) 
12  10.27  (  .50,  22.19) 
16  10.35  (  .55,  22.28) 
1  .oo 
4  1.17 
8  5.84 
12  5.86 
16  6.06 
1  .02  (  .OO,  2.67) 
4  1.14  (  .oo,  8.18) 
8  7.26  (  .OO,  18.45) 
12  8.14  (  .oo,  19.53) 
16  8.42  (  .02,  20.06) 
1  .oo 
4  2.00 
8  5.96 
12  6.86 
16  7.40 
(POIL  first,  RFF  last) 
(Poll) 
(POIL  last,  RFF  first) 
(Poll) 
(  .oo,  .OO) 
(  .OO,  6.76) 
(  .OO,  16.96) 
(  .oo,  17.43) 
(  .OO,  17.96) 
I  (POIL  first,  RS  last) 
(POIL) 
(POIL  last,  RS  first) 
(POIL) 
(  .oo,  .OO) 
(  .OO,  8.93) 
(  .OO,  15.85) 
(  .oo,  17.05) 
(  .OO,  18.13) 
Percent 
of  Variance 
Explained 
95%  Confidence 
Interval 
.oo  (  .oo,  .OO) 
4.86  (1.80,  12.75) 
5.94  (  .OO,  14.67) 
5.80  (  .oo,  14.51) 
5.80  (  .OO,  14.56) 
(RFF) 
9.45  (1.20,  19.48) 
8.89  (2.34,  17.89) 
11.44  (2.95,  21.83) 
11.29  (3.11,  21.63) 
11.27  (3.29,  22.64) 
(RS) 
.oo  (  .oo,  .OO) 
6.84  (  .oo,  15.50) 
15.67  (3.25,  26.55) 
15.74  (3.49,  26.53) 
15.58  (3.63,  26.15) 
(RS) 
3.22  (  .OO,  9.48) 
8.16  (  .45,  17.58) 
21.55  (6.20,  35.57) 
21.75  (6.55,  35.67) 
21.59  (6.62,  35.22) 
(RFD 
oil  price  shock  peaks  in  quarter  nine  and  causes 
employment  to  fall by  .l  1 percent,  while  a  1 per- 
cent  increase  in the  funds  rate  causes  employment 
to  fall  by  roughly  .036  percent.  These  impulse 
responses  correspond  to  a 5 percent  fall in employ- 
ment  due  to  the  1973  oil  embargo  and  a 3.4  per- 
cent  fall  in  employment  resulting  from  the  1980 
monetary  policy  pursued  by  the  Fed.  When  the 
spread  is used  to depict  monetary  policy,  the  effects 
of an oil price  increase  peak  in the  eighth  quarter  at 
-.  085  percent  and  the  effects  of  the  spread  peak 
in  quarter  eleven  at  .0077  percent  (Charts  7a  and 
7b).  Again  these  results  correspond  to  a decline  in 
employment  of 3.8  percent  and  5.7  percent  over  the 
1973  and  1980  episodes,  respectively.  Thus  both 
monetary  policy  and oil price  disturbances  appear  to 
significantly  associate  with  subsequent  movements 
in  employment. 
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